

# Role Model or Role Expansion? Popular Perceptions of the Military in Tunisia

## Appendix

**Table A1: Survey on the Performance of the Military in Tunisia, 2017**

- Q1. What kind of influence is the military having on the *way things are going* in Tunisia?
- Q2. What kind of influence is the military having on *democratic reforms* in Tunisia?
- Q3. What kind of influence is the military having on *economic development* in Tunisia?
- Q4. What kind of influence is the military having on *political stability* in Tunisia?
- Q5. The Tunisian military should contribute to *fighting terrorism in Tunisia*.
- Q6. Officers from the Tunisian military should *serve in the government*.
- Q7. The Tunisian military should contribute to *fighting the economic crisis in Tunisia*.
- Q8. The Tunisian military should contribute to *policing political demonstrations*.
- Q9. The Tunisian military should contribute to *policing economic protests*.
- Q10. The Tunisian military should contribute to *foreign peacekeeping missions by the United Nations or the African Union*.
- Q11. The Tunisian military should maintain a recruitment system based on *general conscription*.

Responses to Q1-4:

- a. Very bad
- b. Somewhat bad
- c. Somewhat good
- d. Very good
- e. No influence
- f. Not sure / don't know
- g. Refuse (Do not read)

Responses to Q5-11:

- a. Strongly disagree
- b. Disagree
- c. Agree
- d. Strongly agree
- e. Not sure/ don't know
- f. Refuse (Do not read)

## أداء الجيش

1. كيفاش تأثير الجيش على الطريقة ألي قاعدة تمشي بيها الأمور في تونس؟ تأثير...

- a. خايب برشا
- b. خايب
- c. باهي
- d. باهي برشا
- e. لا تأثير
- f. موش متأكد/ ما تعرفش
- g. ما نحبش نجاب (ما تقرأش)

2. كيفاش تأثير الجيش على الإصلاحات الديمقراطية في تونس؟ تأثير...

- a. خايب برشا
- b. خايب
- c. باهي
- d. باهي برشا
- e. لا تأثير
- f. موش متأكد/ ما تعرفش
- g. ما نحبش نجاب (ما تقرأش)

3. كيفاش تأثير الجيش على النمو الاقتصادي في تونس؟ تأثير...

- a. خايب برشا
- b. خايب
- c. باهي
- d. باهي برشا
- e. لا تأثير
- f. موش متأكد/ ما تعرفش
- g. ما نحبش نجاب (ما تقرأش)

4. كيفاش تأثير الجيش على الاستقرار السياسي في تونس؟ تأثير...

- a. خايب برشا
- b. خايب
- c. باهي
- d. باهي برشا
- e. لا تأثير
- f. موش متأكد/ ما تعرفش
- g. ما نحبش نجاب (ما تقرأش)

5. لازم يساهم الجيش التّونسي مساهمة فعّالة في مواجهة الإرهاب في تونس

- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكّد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبّش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)

6. لازم ضبّاط الجيش التّونسي يكون عندهم مناصب في الحكومة.

- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكّد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبّش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)

7. لازم يساهم الجيش التّونسي في مواجهة الأزمات الاقتصادية في تونس

- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكّد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبّش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)

8. لازم يتدخّل الجيش التّونسي لمنع المظاهرات السياسيّة في تونس

- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكّد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبّش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)

9. لازم يتدخّل الجيش التّونسي لمنع الاحتجاجات الاقتصادية في تونس


- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكّد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبّش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)

10. لازم يساهم الجيش التونسي في البعثات الأجنبية لحفظ السلام التي تقوم بيها الأمم المتحدة والـالاتحاد الإفريقي.

- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)

11. لازم يحافظ الجيش التونسي على نظام انتداب قائم على أساس التجنيد الإلزامي العام.

- a. ما توافقش بالكلّ
- b. ما توافقش
- c. توافق
- d. توافق برشا
- e. موش متأكد/ ما نعرفش
- f. ما نحبش نجابوب (ما تقرأش)



**South:** Gabès, Kebili, Medenine, Tataouine, and Tozeur

**Table A2: Role Expansion (Legislative Elections)**

	(1) <b>Attitudes on Military Role Expansion (OLS)</b>	(2) <b>Officers in Government (Ordered Logit)</b>	(3) <b>Protest Policing (Ordered Logit)</b>
Nidaa	0.337*** (0.101)	2.051** (0.588)	1.832*** (0.422)
Ennahda	0.116 (0.111)	1.498 (0.462)	1.117 (0.287)
Did not vote	0.282*** (0.102)	2.271*** (0.660)	1.510* (0.357)
Socio-econ dem	0.129** (0.0618)	1.554*** (0.241)	1.168 (0.170)
Organized	-0.000591 (0.0666)	0.893 (0.144)	1.035 (0.161)
Protestor	-0.210*** (0.0723)	0.743 (0.138)	0.625*** (0.108)
Military service	-0.0112 (0.0870)	0.991 (0.213)	1.006 (0.207)
South	-0.0326 (0.111)	1.153 (0.348)	0.841 (0.207)
Center	-0.0200 (0.0846)	1.051 (0.227)	0.945 (0.188)
Northwest	0.216** (0.0928)	1.415 (0.303)	1.565* (0.373)
Low income	0.189* (0.103)	1.425 (0.369)	1.373 (0.344)
Middle income	0.0639 (0.0826)	0.941 (0.204)	1.226 (0.248)
Basic education	0.581*** (0.0869)	2.580*** (0.541)	3.146*** (0.683)
Secondary edu	0.194** (0.0752)	1.474* (0.295)	1.422* (0.258)
Female	0.396*** (0.0663)	2.462*** (0.398)	2.093*** (0.332)
Age	-0.00540 (0.0128)	0.983 (0.0322)	0.999 (0.0310)
N	694	646	681
R-squared	0.243		
Chi <sup>2</sup> (df)		160.97*** (16)	136.73***(16)

Cell entries are odds ratios in models 2 and 3, robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A3: Role Expansion (Presidential Elections)**

	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<b>Attitudes on Military Role Expansion (OLS)</b>	<b>Officers in Government (Ordered Logit)</b>	<b>Protest Policing (Ordered Logit)</b>
Essebsi	0.326*** (0.0889)	1.674** (0.370)	1.902*** (0.407)
Did not vote	0.202** (0.0889)	1.502* (0.344)	1.521** (0.323)
Socio-econ dem	0.114* (0.0655)	1.562*** (0.255)	1.111 (0.168)
Organized	-0.00269 (0.0693)	0.895 (0.150)	1.020 (0.165)
Protestor	-0.221*** (0.0732)	0.710* (0.132)	0.600*** (0.107)
Military service	-0.0254 (0.0894)	1.041 (0.236)	0.954 (0.203)
South	-0.0186 (0.116)	1.171 (0.364)	0.861 (0.236)
Center	0.00764 (0.0883)	1.113 (0.259)	0.996 (0.211)
Northwest	0.207** (0.0939)	1.404 (0.309)	1.535* (0.369)
Low income	0.266** (0.108)	1.853** (0.497)	1.457 (0.386)
Middle income	0.129 (0.0875)	1.181 (0.265)	1.299 (0.279)
Basic education	0.540*** (0.0888)	2.368*** (0.509)	2.875*** (0.636)
Secondary edu	0.179** (0.0774)	1.347 (0.276)	1.403* (0.261)
Female	0.376*** (0.0687)	2.450*** (0.410)	1.997*** (0.329)
Age	-0.00763 (0.0136)	0.969 (0.0332)	1.003 (0.0330)
Observations	643	599	634
R-squared	0.236		
Chi <sup>2</sup> (df)		123.08*** (12)	115.92*** (12)

Cell entries are odds ratios in models 5 and 6, robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A4: Support for Other Military Roles**

	Legislative			Presidential		
	(1) Fighting Terrorism	(2) Peace- keeping	(3) Economic crisis	(4) Fighting Terrorism	(5) Peace- keeping	(6) Economic crisis
Nidaa	1.404 (0.361)	1.056 (0.203)	0.876 (0.169)			
Ennahda	1.160 (0.350)	1.009 (0.236)	0.954 (0.221)			
Essebsi				1.153 (0.315)	1.119 (0.252)	0.841 (0.179)
Did not vote	1.142 (0.291)	0.870 (0.164)	0.780 (0.154)	1.092 (0.323)	0.919 (0.216)	0.732 (0.172)
Socio-econ dem	0.719 (0.149)	1.294 (0.227)	1.284 (0.202)	0.720 (0.151)	1.282 (0.225)	1.301* (0.208)
Organized	0.700 (0.161)	1.254 (0.229)	1.432* (0.275)	0.717 (0.165)	1.259 (0.229)	1.419* (0.268)
Protestor	1.155 (0.296)	1.242 (0.245)	0.988 (0.199)	1.145 (0.293)	1.249 (0.247)	0.979 (0.198)
Military service	0.944 (0.291)	1.164 (0.285)	0.921 (0.221)	0.960 (0.292)	1.164 (0.283)	0.915 (0.218)
South	1.749 (0.722)	0.575** (0.161)	1.109 (0.280)	1.747 (0.720)	0.591* (0.167)	1.071 (0.276)
Center	0.634* (0.170)	0.923 (0.204)	1.203 (0.298)	0.635* (0.170)	0.930 (0.207)	1.193 (0.298)
Northwest	0.914 (0.295)	0.621* (0.168)	1.224 (0.268)	0.909 (0.294)	0.622* (0.170)	1.240 (0.268)
Low income	0.576 (0.241)	1.059 (0.305)	1.206 (0.337)	0.587 (0.243)	1.068 (0.308)	1.186 (0.326)
Middle income	0.689 (0.242)	1.351 (0.307)	1.211 (0.293)	0.711 (0.247)	1.370 (0.314)	1.183 (0.284)
Basic edu	0.721 (0.231)	0.912 (0.213)	1.986*** (0.465)	0.712 (0.230)	0.905 (0.210)	2.007*** (0.470)
Secondary edu	0.797 (0.229)	0.863 (0.178)	1.480** (0.282)	0.793 (0.228)	0.857 (0.178)	1.498** (0.289)
Female	0.574** (0.133)	0.765 (0.151)	0.982 (0.176)	0.577** (0.132)	0.760 (0.150)	0.985 (0.176)
Age	0.942 (0.0443)	1.009 (0.0384)	1.066* (0.0367)	0.946 (0.0445)	1.009 (0.0381)	1.066* (0.0367)
N	633	572	582	633	572	582
Chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	26.87(16)**	20.73(16)	30.92(16)**	26.00(15)**	21.00(15)	30.60(15)***

Cell entries are odds ratios; robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table A5: Approval of Military Rule (Future Election)**

	(1) Ordered Logit
Nidaa	1.418 (0.467)
Ennahda	1.677** (0.429)
Did not vote	1.630** (0.357)
Organized	0.702 (0.181)
Protest	0.707* (0.143)
Age	0.992 (0.00558)
Male	0.760* (0.127)
Secondary edu	1.684* (0.515)
Basic education	1.135 (0.186)
Standard of living bad	1.230 (0.271)
Standard of living neutral	0.938 (0.189)
N	573
Chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	28.86(11)***

Cell entries are odds ratios, robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A6: Approval of Military Rule (Past Election)**

	(1) Ordered logit
Decided not to vote	1.398** (0.215)
Organized	0.535** (0.138)
Protest	0.764 (0.140)
Age	1.004 (0.00513)
Male	0.713** (0.101)
Secondary edu	1.080 (0.307)
Basic education	0.855 (0.123)
Standard of living bad	1.211 (0.248)
Standard of living neutral	1.117 (0.221)
Observations	762

Cell entries are odds ratios, robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Proportional Odds Assumption**

As mentioned in the text, a Brant test shows that the proportional odds (PO) assumption of ordered logit models might be violated in models 2 ( $p=0.051$ ) in Table 2 and 5 ( $p=0.075$ ) in Table 3 (both Figure 4b in the text), as well as in the Afrobarometer model on approval of military rule (Table 5 in the appendix and Figure 8 in the text). We examine here whether this potential violation of model assumptions influences our results by specifying partial proportional odds models. The results show that the proportional odds assumption is not violated for any of our variables of interest and that the findings are robust to this change in modelling strategy.

Table 7 shows partial proportional odds specifications for models 2 and 5, respectively. For ease of comparison, the original models are also reported again. As can be seen from the models in Table 7, the PO assumption might be violated for the income variables in Model 2 and the education variables in Model 5. Relaxing the PO assumption does not substantively alter the results on our variables of interest.

Substantively, this suggests that in Model 2 income exerts a significant effect on the movement from strongly disagree and disagree on the one hand and agree and strongly agree on the other, but not on the intensity of agreement (disagreement). In Model 5, in turn, the same is true for secondary education, while the strength of the effect of basic education varies by category.

Table 8 shows a partial proportional odds specification for the original model in Table 5. The PO assumption is violated for both the Nidaa and the age variables. The conclusion with respect to the effect of non-voting is unchanged. Support for Nidaa is only significant in explaining the difference between strong approval of military rule and the other categories, but not for any of the other partial equations. Age is significant only in the binary comparison between agreement and disagreement.

**Table A7: Partial Proportional Odds Models**

	Partial Proportional Odds*				Partial Proportional Odds*			
	Model 2, Table 2	SD vs. D, A, SA	SD, D vs. A, SA	SD, D, A vs SA	Model 5, Table 3	SD vs. D, A, SA	SD, D vs. A, SA	SD, D, A vs SA
Nidaa	2.016** (0.571)	2.039** (0.584)						
Essebsi					1.638** (0.350)	1.670** (0.360)		
Ennahda	1.481 (0.453)	1.485 (0.460)						
Did not vote	2.280*** (0.655)	2.313*** (0.670)			1.494* (0.336)	1.519* (0.342)		
Socio-econ dem	1.538*** (0.237)	1.550*** (0.241)			1.543*** (0.250)	1.537*** (0.251)		
Organized	0.892 (0.144)	0.889 (0.145)			0.894 (0.150)	0.887 (0.151)		
Protestor	0.749 (0.136)	0.751 (0.137)			0.718* (0.131)	0.707* (0.131)		
Military service	0.972 (0.209)	0.960 (0.208)			1.028 (0.231)	1.029 (0.228)		
Low income	1.502 (0.383)	1.311 (0.412)	2.676*** (0.800)	0.914 (0.322)	1.977*** (0.519)	2.010*** (0.535)		
Middle income	0.955 (0.208)	0.793 (0.203)	1.378 (0.360)	0.792 (0.254)	1.202 (0.271)	1.222 (0.284)		
Basic education	2.655*** (0.554)	2.646*** (0.551)			2.434*** (0.518)	1.830** (0.480)	3.626*** (0.884)	2.207*** (0.665)
Secondary edu	1.496** (0.299)	1.475** (0.292)			1.367 (0.279)	1.030 (0.247)	1.849*** (0.420)	1.524 (0.471)
Female	2.465*** (0.398)	2.474*** (0.406)			2.452*** (0.410)	2.443*** (0.416)		
Age	0.986 (0.0321)	0.988 (0.0327)			0.972 (0.0331)	0.970 (0.0333)		
Observations		646				599		

\*Only one set of coefficients is presented for variables that meet the proportional odds assumption; SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree.

Cell entries are odds ratios; robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A8: Partial Proportional Odds Model**

	Partial Proportional Odds*			
	Model 1, Table 5	SD vs. D, A, SA	SD, D vs. A, SA	SD, D, A vs SA
Nidaa	1.418 (0.467)	1.126 (0.365)	1.140 (0.367)	2.163** (0.732)
Ennahda	1.677** (0.429)	1.684** (0.441)		
Did not vote	1.630** (0.357)	1.643** (0.367)		
Organized	0.702 (0.181)	0.698 (0.182)		
Protest	0.707* (0.143)	0.706* (0.143)		
Age	0.992 (0.00558)	0.996 (0.00636)	0.982*** (0.00608)	0.996 (0.00625)
Male	0.760* (0.127)	0.765 (0.127)		
Secondary edu	1.684* (0.515)	1.644 (0.499)		
Basic education	1.135 (0.186)	1.116 (0.184)		
Standard of living bad	1.230 (0.271)	1.210 (0.268)		
Standard of living neutral	0.938 (0.189)	0.932 (0.189)		
N	573		573	
Chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	28.86(11)***		53.55(15)***	

\*Only one set of coefficients is presented for variables that meet the proportional odds assumption; SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree.

Cell entries are odds ratios; robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

